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THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF EXTERNAL BORROWING 
I. Introduction 
1.1 In a recent work on "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development" 
/3/, Hollis B. Chenery and Alan N. Strout use a model that does not take ex-
plicit account of the cost of external borrowing. Since the bulk of "assis-
tance" as they define it /Ibid., p. 679 n/ actually constitutes loans and 
foreign private investme.nt at various contractual terms, the omission of the 
cost of external "assistance" to recipients of such assistance iA unrealistic. 
It has, moreover, resulted in an analysis that is logically unsatisfactory. 
The logical confusion is evident in the following statement (Ibid., 
pp. 686-687): 
" .••.we need some minimal assumptions as to the objectives 
of the recipient country and the conditions under which aid 
is provided. We assume that aid is sufficiently limited--­
or expensive---to make the recipient country unwilling or 
unable to increase aid merely to increase consumption with­
out also securing some rise in GNP. Second, we assume that 
the country tries to maximize consumption until the target 
growth rate is attained ..... Under the assumption made, 
there is is no incentive to .... increase aid by reducing 
saving." (Italics added) 
The italicized statement plays a crucial role in the Chenery-Strout analy­
sis which underscores the welfare-efficiency of pushing savings to its maximurn--­
given either by the saving limit or by the minimum trade gap whichever happens to 
be binding---, a policy, in other words, of minimizing consumption every year 
to the extent feasible (see, e.g., Ibid., Section C, pp. 697-701). The state-
ment, however, does not logically follow from the assumptions made. It is not 
clear how a country which tries to maximize consumption and which would presumably 
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be both able and willing to increase aid to increase consumption after securing 
some rise in GNP, nevertheless should have no incentive to reduce saving. Under 
the assumptions made, in fact, the question seems to be wide open, to be settled 
only by an explicit consideration of the cost of external borrowing. 
1.2 The omission of the cost of external borrowing as an explicit argument 
has led, it appears, to another confusion that has critically impaired the prac­
tical usefulness of the model and its analysis as a guide to policy. What has 
been called gross national product (GNP, defined in p. 683) throughout the analysis 
actually stands for gross domestic product (GDP) as it is understood in national 
accounting. The use of GDP, instead of GNP proper, as the growth argument has 
taken away the welfare relevance of the analysis considerably. Insofar as external 
borrowing involved a contractual obligation to pay interest that is respected by 
the recipient country,·· the relevant growth argument for welfare analysis is not 
GDP but GNP proper, defined as GDP minus interest charges on external debt~ 
Failure to recognize the above distinction between GDP and GNP has 
resulted in missing a significant aspect of the economics of external borrowing: 
as long as a net capital inflow continues into a country, all interest charges 
2 are, in effect, compounded. This has a significant bearing on national welfare 
accounting for the recipient country, arising from the fact that the same cumulative 
total of net capital inflows over any given period (number of successive years) 
gives different cumulative totals of net borrowing (total borrowing inclusive of 
interest payments but exclusive of debt retirement) 3 according to different time­
distributions of the former, and vice versa. Since interest is payable on the 
second item, the argument with which the rate of growth of national income over the 
period in question---given the rate of growth of domestic product---varies is the 
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second, irrespective of the magnitude of the first. For example, given the rate 
of growth of GDP, the rate of growth of GNP over any given period will be lower 
the more biased is the time-distribution of any given total net capital inflows 
towards the earlier years. Thus, if we regard national, and not domestic, income 
as the relevant welfare argument---a principle that is actually practiced in most 
countries and for sound reasons---, it is not possible to logically formulate 
a determinate policy of external borrowing without explicitly bringing interest 
charges, and hence total external borrowing, in the model. 
1.3 This brings out the difficulty of logically deducing the Chenery-Strout 
strategy of pushing domestic saving to its maximum from the assumptions postulated 
in the authors' own paper. The authors also seek to draw support (see Ibid., p. 701) 
for their strategy from another work /4/ where a linear social welfare function has 
been used to deduce the "optimum" time-pattern of growth and capital inflows. 4 
With no non-linearities in the system, optimization would necessarily require 
going to one extreme or the other in every period; the use of a rate of time-discount 
that is lower than the rate of return on investment, and an index of psvch:ic dis­
utility from capital inflows 5 that is higher than the index of utility of consump­
tion, ensures that it is advantageous always t_o postpone consumption in favour of 
investment, and to refrain from using external resources for consumption as long 
as the limit to saving is not reached. But linearity in the social welfare 
function is a strong assumption that is unsupported either by reason or by evidence. 
A strategy derived from a linear welfare function, while it may be instructive as 
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an analytical exercise, cannot claim any normative character, and cannot be 
accepted as the basis of a general welfare theory of capital inflows and growth. 
1.4 In this paper we reconstruct the Chenery-Strout model so that the 
main element of choice lies in regulating the time-distribution of the flow of 
external resources into a developing country over a stipulated "perspective­
plan" period while keeping fixed the cumulative total of 'external debts over the 
whole period. The problem differs from the Chenery-Strout specifications in (a) 
fixing a target plan-terminal national income as it is actually understood in 
national accounting, and (b) using a non-linear welfare function to evaluate the 
stream of consumption during the perspective-plan period. The analysis brings 
out "optimum"time-patterns of net-external borrowing that are strikingly different 
from that indicated in the Chenery-Strout strategy and shows in particular how 
welfare-maximizing behaviour in recipient countries should involve external borrow­
ing not only for investment but for consumption as well if it is possible to 
borrow in sufficient quantities. The results have significant bearing on the 
question of rationing external "assistance' 1 to underdeveloped countries if the 
supply of "assistance 11 is scarce instead, and suggest that one should use the 
total savings function, and not marginal savings rates alone as suggested by 
~ ·I:;:- µ
Chenery and Strout, as the "standard of performanceI!.~'< 
II. The Problem Stated 
For analytical convenience the problem is considered as one of continuous 
6time. The model has the following definitional relations: 
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(1) Vt= Ct+ It - Ft: Gross domestic product equals consumption plus investment 
minus net capital inflows, defined as imports minus exports; imports do not include 
interest payments on outstanding external debt; 
(2) Yt = V - iB Gross national income equals gross domestic product minus in-t t 
terest payments; 
(3) F = B - iB : Net capital inflows equal change in external indebtednesst t t . 
(net total borrowing) minus interest payments. 
These three relations yield: 
The production function is given by the familiar Harrod-Domar equation: 
(5) v; bit: Marginal output-capital ratio is a constant, 'b'. 
Investment has to satisfy the following: 
Bt < • : 1m1t investment b .(6) I t I e Upper 1 · · to · ( a sorpt1.ve. capacity) grows0 
at a constant rate '6 1·, starting from initial investment (historically given as 
an initial condition). 
The problem, presented in a general form, is to maximize J! U(Ct) dt, 
subject to 
(7) YT= yo,egT maximize the integral of utility derived from (instantaneous) 
consumption over a plan-period covering T time-units, subject to the condition that 
over this period national income should grow at a given average rate, 'g'. 
Requirement (7) imposes only a terminal condition on the growth of national 
income. In order to allow the model maximum freedom to reveal its basic character 
in relation to maximizing the postulated functional, no constraint is imposed on the 
time-path of national income within the plan-period, nor any on the amount of~ 
Sumption that the nation can physically absorb during any given interval of time. 
6 
7A time-discount is not used for standard ethical reasons. 
III. Analytical Solution 
It is easy to see that if 'b' is higher than the rate of interest 'i' on 
external borrowing, it would be efficient to invest up to investment-absorptive 
capacity always. 8 In other words, relation (6) would hold as a strict equality in 
the optimum programme throughout. Assuming b > i, we can then proceed with 
(6.1) == I -e 
at .It 0 
Substituting (6.1) into (S) and integrating we obtain the optimum time-
path of gross domestic product: 
b St b(8) V == -. I e (V+ - s•Io).t (3 0 0 
Normalizing V as unity, we have 
0 
(8.1) Vt= l·IoeSt 
Using (6.1) and (8.1) in (4), we have 
8t
(4.1) Ct = >.. 1e + Bt - iBt + >, 2 ; where >-. = I <% 1)· A = 1 ~ 1 0 ' 2 s 
Choice of time-path of consumption, Ct, now reduces to choice of the 
time-path of external borrowing, Bt. 
We now have a problem in the classical calculus of variations where the 
time-path of Bis to be found so as to maximize the functional IT U(C )dt, with 
0 t 
Ct a function of Bt and Bt as given by (4.1). The initial and terminal conditions 
are given by 
(9) B = given (outstanding indebtedness 
0 
at the beginning of the plan-period); and 
and YT given by (8) and (7) respectively. 




U" (C )• t 
Assuming U"(Ct) < o, i.e., diminishing marginal utility from instantaneous 
consumption, £ stands for the absolute value of the point-elasticity of marginal 
utility. Equation (11) then says that optimum rate of growth of consumption at 
every point of time equals the ratio of the rate of interest on external borrowing 
over the absolute value of the elasticity of marginal utility from consumption at 
that point of time. 
For simplifying the rest of the analysis, we shall assume that the elas­
ticity of marginal utility from consumption is a constant, so that U(Ct) may be rep­
resented as 
1 1-v
(12) =-- Ct , a form that is already familiar in the optimum-growth1-v 
literature, with 'v' standing for the constant elasticity of marginal utility from 
instantaneous consumption. 
The optimality condition (11) then becomes 
(11.1) 
Combining (11.1) with (4.1) and arranging terms, we have the differential 
equation 
d
2B i(l+v) (1-vf3) Bt i 
(13) " . e2 V V 1 V 
dt 
with initial and terminal conditions given by (9) and (10). 
The solution of this differential equation is given by 
iir -T
1 iT St(14) Bt = -/j (e
V 
al - a2) e 
it + 1. 
/j (a2 - e a )e
V b. e + 42- where1 -(3-i l ' 
ir 
V it
/j = e - e 
a = B + ~ - !:21 0 13-i i 
Equation (14) gives, under the assumptions of the problem, the optimum 
time-path of external borrowing during the stipulated perspective-plan period. 
Correspondingly, the optimum time-path of consumption is given by 
i-t 
(15) ct = C 0 
. A
2
e V where 
C = i(l.:..1). A2.
0 V 
IV. Quantitative Solutions 
In this section quantitative solutions are presented for two different values 
of 'v', using Pakistan's figures as the initial conditions, and the Chenery-M~cEwan 
specifications in /3/ about the structural parameters for this country. The target 
growth rate for GNP is arbitrarily fixed at 7 per cent, and the rate of interest 
on external borrowing likewise at 6 per cent. The qualitative characters of the 
two solutions and the lessons obtained therefrom are believed to be of fairly 
general validity. 
The various parameters in the two exercises have the following values: 
Initial conditions (normalized)lO 
I = .15842 B = .05383; Y = 1-iB = .99677 
0 0 0 0 
Incremental output-capital ratio: b = .33; 
Rate of growth of investment-absorptive capacity: B = .13 
Target growth rate for GNP: g = .07; 
Rate of interest on external borrowing: i = .06; 
. 2 6 11Elasticity of marginal utility from instantaneous consumption: v = , •• 
The solutions for the two values of 'v' are given in Tables 1 and 2 re­
spectively. 
Main features of the quantitative solutions 
Solution 1 : v = 2 
1) The rate of borrowing (Bt, the rate of change in outstanding indebted­
ness) is heavy from the beginning, and rises slowly. Net capital inflows (Ft) 
is also heavy initially and rises for the first few years. After a point it starts 
to decline, and actually becomes negative in a last phase of the plan. 
(Since initially interests payments are low, the bulk of total borrowing 
consists of net capital inflows. Gradually, interest payments mount up, and a 
larger and larger portion of total borrowing is used up only to pay interest charges 
so that less and less net capital inflows are obtained. Towards the end of the 
plan total borr6wing is not enough even to cover all interest payments, so that a 
reverse flow of net capital is generated.) 
2) Consumption (Ct) is heavy from the beginning, and rises slowly (at 
the rate i/v, i.e., 3 per cent a year). It exceeds gross domestic product (Vt) 
for about the first 12 years, after which GDP catches up and surpasses consumption. 
Consumption exceeds gross national income (Y) until the last two years of the plan.
t 
Gross domestic saving, defined as gross domestic product minus consumption 
(S:), is accordingly negative in the first 12 years and positive thereafter. The 
rate of domestic saving reaches the high figure of around 55 per cent at the end 
of the plan. Gross national saving (S~, column), definec as gross national 
product minus consumption, is negative until the last two years of the plans, 
when it becomes positive and rises sharply to reach a plan-terminal rate of about 
18 per cent. 
(3) Gross national income (Yt) initially falls and then rises, slowly 
at first and accelerating later, reaching a plan-terminal rate of growth of approxi­
mately 16 per cent per annum. 
Solution 2: v = .6 
1) The rate of borrowing is low initially and rises rapidly over time. 
The time-distribution of net capital inflows is skewed in the opposite direction, 
(i.e., biased in favour of later years) than in solution 1. 
2) Consumption is lower :initially than in solution 1, but grows at a 
much faster rate (10 per cent a year). It exceeds both domestic and national pro­
duct from after the second year, so that both gross domestic saving and gross 
national saving are negative from this time ·on. 
3) Gross national income rises throughout the period, accelerating 
less rapidly than in solution 1, and reaches a plan-terminal growth rate of approxi­
mately 11 per cent per annum. 
The cumulative total of net capital inflows. JC Ft dt, is substantiallv higher 
in solution 2 than in solution 1. 
(' ' 
~ Table 1 
's (V = 2) 








0 .997 1.000 .158 .054 .986 ,003 .983 1. 725 - • 725 -.730 
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4 .993 1,274 ,266 4.677 1,330 ,281 1.049 2.057 
5 1,005 1,368 .303 6,051 1.418 .363 1.055 2,120 -.550 -1.109 074 +.012 
6 1.024 1.475 .346 7.512 1.505 .451 1.055 2.lo4 
7 1.053 1.597 ,394 9,061 1,591 .544 1.047 2.250 
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14 1.766 3.080 .978 21,893 1,988 1,314 .674 2. 776 
15 1.991 3.424 1.113 23,880 1.983 1,433 .550 2.861 + .164 -1.437 .112 .121 
16 2.266 3,817 1.268 25.85C 1.950 1,551 .400 2.949 
17 2.598 4,264 1,444 27.770 1.885 1.666 .218 -3 .038 
18 2. 997 4. 773 1,645 29,605 1. 779 1. 776 .003 3.131 -.045 
19 3.473 5.352 1.873 31.312 1,625 1,879 -.253 3,226 +.071 
20 4.042 6 .012 2.133 32.837 1.415 1,970 -.555 3.324 +.553 +.178 .123 .164 
t 
f 
0 \ dt = 14.668 
Table 2~ 
(V =.6) 
d n V y y yt Yt Vt It Bt Bt iBt Ft Ct St St t+l-t t+l-t 
Vt Vt vt -Vt
0 .997 1.000 .158 .054 .057 .003 .054 .896 .104 .101
1 1.047 1.056 .180 .143 .123 .009 .114 .990 .062 .054 .056 .0502 1.101 1.119 .205 .303 .198 .018 .180 1.094 .022 .006
3 1.160 1,192 .234 .542 .284 ,032 .252 1.210 -.015 -.0434 1.222 1.274 .266 .873 .381 .052 .329 1.337
5 1.290 1.368 .303. 1,308 .490 .078 .412 1.477 -.080 -.145 .074 .0566 1.363 1.475 .346 1.859 .614 .112 .502 1.631
7 1.445 1.597 .394 2.540 .752 .152 .600 1.803
8 1.534 1.736 .448 3.369 .908 .202 . 706 1,994
9 1.632 1.894 .510 4.362 1.081 .262 .819 2.203 
11
10 1.741 2.073 .581 5.538 1.274 .332 .942 2,434 -.174 -.398 .095 ,0671.863 2.278 .662 6.918 1.489 .415 1.074 2.69012 2.001 2,512 .754 8.525 1. 727 .511 1.216 2.974
13 2.154 2. 777 ,859 10.380 1.990 .623 1.367 3.285
14 2,329 3.080 . 928 12.512 2.280 .751 1.529 3.681
15 2.527 3.424 1.113 14.95C 2.600 .897 1.703 4.014 - .172 -.588 .112 .08516 2.754 3.817 1.268 17. 722 2.950 1.063 1.887 4.43617 3.013 4.264 1,444 20.850 3,333 1.251 2.082 4. 90218 3.309 4.773 1.645 24.402 3.754 1.464 2.290 5.418
1,9 3,649 5.352 1.873 28.380 4.210 1.703 2.507 5.986
20 4.042 6. 012 2.133 32.837 4. 708 1.970 2.738 6.617 -.110 -.637 .123 .108 
T 
f F dt = 21,888
t
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V. Lessons from the Exercises 
From the purely economic point of view the two exercises demonstrate 
how very wide the time-distribution of net capital inflows, and also the cumulative 
total of these inflows, can be correspomding to the same cumulative total of ex­
ternal borrowing (Bt) over a given time-interval (20 years in our problem) •. 
This brings out the necessity for planners in the recipient country to face squarely 
the choice that has been designed in this paper in any rational approach to external 
borrowing that uses a target growth rate in terms of national income over a suffic­
iently long period. 
Insofar as variation of the time-distribution of external borrowing varies the 
time-path of consumption accordingly--given the time-path of investment--, rational 
planning must inevitably rest on some sort of ordering of alternative consumption 
programmes over time. The use of a conventional non-linear valuation of the 
stream of consumption, with two widely different but entirely plausible values of 
the elasticity of marginal utility from instantaneous consumption, indicates one 
common feature of the resulting "optimum" policies that is radically different from 
what is suggested in the Chenery-Strout paper: In both the situations optimum 
consumption exceeds both GNP and GDP, and optimum savings is far less than any 
conceivable 'saving limit', for significant stretches of the plan-period. This 
indicates unequivocally that external borrowing would be used for increasing con­
sumption during significant time stretches under any reasonable welfare-maximizing 
behavior on the part of recipient countries where the incremental output-capital 
ratio is significantly higher than both the rate of interest on external borrowing 
and the target growth rate for national income. The underlying argument is easy to 
see intuitively: 
14 
With a plan-period sufficiently large, the high productivity of investment 
would make terminal national income substantially hir,her than the target if invest­
ment were always maintained at the rapidly growing level of absorptive capacity 
and domestic saving maintained at its 'upper limit'. The margin thus made available 
can be used, as it were, to increase consumption, i.e., to reduce saving, by 
further external borrowing during the plan-period. In other words, the "incentive 
to increase aid by reducing saving" would be very much there: if the country is 
able to increase aid to increase consumption after securing the stipulated rise in 
GNP, it will clearly be rational for it to do so, unless it were unwilling to do 
so for wholly exLra-economic reasons. 
How exactly the above margin will be "distributed" for consumption over the 
different time-phases of the plan-period will depend on how fast marginal utility 
from consumption at every point of time falls with additional consumption. As is 
well-known, and is also demonstrated in the exercises in this paper, a higher 
elasticity of marginal utility calls for a higher initial consumption and a lower 
rate of growth of consumption than a lower elasticity. It is also of interest to 
note that the "discrimination" against earlier consumption that a lower elasticity 
indicates also implies a higher cumulative total of net capital inflows over the 
given plan-period (i.e., a higher total real transfer of resources over the period) 
out of the same cumulative total of external borrowing. 
VI. Conclusion 
Three extreme assumptions--(1) the target growth rate of national income is 
concerned only with the average growth rate over the whole perspective-plan period; 
15 
(2) that it is possible to absorb any amount of consumption during any time 
interval; and (3) a perfectly elastic supply of external finance--have certainly 
made our model unrealistic. The analysis nevertheless highlights a moral that 
is of general validity: the availability of external resources enables a countrv 
to have any given rate of growth of national income with less austerity on its 
own part. There is no reason why developing countries should not see this possi­
bility and act accordingly. 
Coming back to the Chenery-Strout analysis, the emphasis laid on maximizing 
domestic savings and thereby minimizing the cumulative total of net capital inflows 
during a country's transition to "self-sustaining growth" is understandable from 
the point of view of donours to external "assistance", but is not convincing as an 
efficient strategy from the point of view of the recipient country's welfare. The 
harmony of interests that the Chenery-Strout analysis presumes does not exist 
in reality. Empirical evidence can be cited from the Pakistan case as it has been 
noted in the Chenery-Strout paper itself (Ibid., p. 694,n), over the period 
1954-55 to 1959-69, the period which marks the beginning or a steady flow of 
external resources into the country, Pakistan shm-1s a negative marginal rate of 
saving, indicating that a part of foreign aid must have been used to increase con­
sumption. 
In the presence of such a conflict of interests between donours and recipients 
of external "assistance" the wisdom of rationing scarce external capital among the 
latter on the basis of marginal savings rates as suggested by Chenery and Strout 
is open to question. It self-help is to be forced on the recipients--from the 
analysis of welfare-maximizing behaviour in this paper forced, it seems, it has to· 
be--external "assistance" should be related to the total savings function and not 
16 
the marginal rate of saving alone. For, abstracting from other differences, a 
country with a higher total savings function albeit with a lower marginal rate 
of saving will be showing more self-help than one with a lower total savings 
function albeit with a higher marginal savings rate in the relevant income range; 
the former will also need less cumulative total of net capital inflows to reach 
12the stage of "self-sustaining growth" , and will reach this stage earlier. This 
point is missed in the Chenery-Strout analysis because of implicitly defining the 
saving limit this definition is explicit in the Chenery-MacEwan paper--as taking 
off from the historically given trend savings in the base-year, as can be seen from 
the quantitative exercises in the paper. The choice of saving is presented as 
choice of the marginal savings rate only, assuming away a large part of the problem 
of optimizing the rate of saving--3in a developing country both from its own point of 
view and also from the point of view of the donours of external "assistance". Quite 
apart from this, as an efficiency criterion the idea of relating "assistance" to 
marginal savings rates alone and not to the total savings function is liable to be 
self-defeating; for it would encourage a country motivated by understandable worldly 
desires to consume lavishly until it confronts the aid-giving "consortium", thereby 
pushing down the historical trend of saving as much as it can, and then promise a high 
marginal rate of saving in order to get "whatever amount of aid it requested". And 
as a principle of allocation of "assistance" it is liable to be inequitable, discrim­
inating as it would against a country showing greater self-help but failing if it 
does to show a high enough marginal rate of saving. 
17 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. For expositional simplicity, we assume in this paper that interest 
payment is the only element of factor payments to foreigners. The general 
lessons derived from the analysis are not crucially dependent on this assump­
tion. 
2. Interest charges may be paid as they accrue, individually, but a 
positive net capital inflow implies that the country must have borrowed 
to pay interest charges also, in addition to borrowing to finance an 
excess of imports (excluding interest payments) over exports. 
3. It is necessary to distinguish between at least three different con­
cepts: (1) an excess of imports, exclusive of interest payments, over 
exports: this is called net capital inflows in this as in the Chenery-Strout 
paper; (2) the amount by which outstanding indebtedness changes, i.e., net 
capital inflows as defined above plus interest payments on outstanding debts: 
this will be called net borrowing,often simply borrowing; (3) net borrowing 
as defined above plus debt retirement: this does not appear in the present 
analysis but the term gross borrowing may be recorded to complete the picture. 
4. The welfare function used is of the form W = 
00 
r D (C -yF ), where C andt=1 t t t 
F stand for consumption and foreign aid, y the index of disutility of aid, 
and D a discount factor which follm-Js the familiar compounding principle 
except that the rate of discount is raised (from .08 to .10) as t passes T, 
the last year of the "Perspective Plan" period. 
5. Curiously, the cost of foreign aid in terms of interest charges is not 
considered in this work either, while the bulk of foreign 'aid' for Pakistan 
with which this work is specifically interested, consist of loans and for­
eign private investment. 
ii 
6. The model is in some respects similar to one used by Hamada /7/, but 
differs from the latter in (a) using a finite instead of infinite plan-hori­
zon; (b) imposing a target national income for the plan-terminal year; and 
(c) following the Chenery-HacEwan-Strout specification about relation between 
output and investment. 
7. See Ramsay /9/ and Tinbergen /10/. 
8. The proof is left to the reader. 
9. See Chakravarty /2/; also Tinbergen /10/ and Goodwin /6/. 
10. The actual values are (at current prices): V (1964-65) = Rupees 46906 
0 
million, using c.s.o. wholesale price deflator on an estimate of GDP at con-
stant prices kindly supplied by Gustav Papanek (unpublished); I (1964-65) = 
0 
Rupees 7431 million, from Pakistan's Third Five-Year Plan; B (outstanding
0 
at the beginning of 1964) = Rupees 2525 million, from Andrews and Mohammed 
/1/. 
An error in specification of the initial structure of Pakistan is 
because of the discrepancy between the time argument of B and that of V and 
0 0 
l . This is not of major importance in the exercises designed to provide quali-0 
tative insights only. 
11. Frisch's 1932 study /5/ of individual elasticities range from well below 
1 to well above 6, rising as the level of consumption falls. Although the 
elasticity of marginal utility from consumption in the social welfare function 
need not follow directly from observed individual elasticities, the latter 
may be presumed as a guide to a plausible range for the former. 
12. The Chenery-Strout definition of "self-sustaining growth" defining it as 
"growth at a given rate with capital inflows limited to a specified ratio to 
GNP which can be sustained without concessional financing," (italics added) 
is logically overdefined. Of the two conditions in italics, only one will 
in general be binding. A more satisfactory definition is provided in 
/8, p. 105/: "Self-sustained growth is defined to mean a rate of income in­
crease of, say, 5 per cent p.a., financed out of domestically generated funds 
and out of foreign capital which flows into the country because it wants to do 
SO• II 
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13. As a corollary, the problem of maximizing the rate of saving is con­
ceived as a problem of maximizing the marginal rate of saving only. A 
particularly serious logical difficulty follows from this: Suppose, given 
the historical ex-post saving in some (arbitrary) base year, t, an upper-
o 
limit saving function has been estimated by estimating the upper-limit to the 
marginal rate of saving only. Suppose now that in some subsequent year, t.,. ]. 
the trade-limit rather than the saving-limit thus defined is binding, so that 
ex-post saving in year t. 
]. 
is less than estimated upper-limit saving for this 
year.. A serious question arises whether the upper-limit saving function for 
years subsequent to ti would be given by the function estimated with reference 
to ex-post saving in the arbitrarily chosen "base year" or with reference to 
that in year t 
]. 
.. It has got to be the latter, if the maximum marginal rate of 
saving is defined to be independent of historical saving prior to the year in 
question, as Chenery and Strout appear to have defined it. 
This indicates that the whole concept of saving-limit, and the concomittant 
theory of the two-resource gaps as presented in the Chenery-Strout paper, rest 
on elusive definitions. It also questions the validity of the saving-limits 
used in the quantitative exercises in the said paper: the historical "base-year" 
saving from which the saving-limit-functions for the respective countries 
start may, for some of them at least, actually have been the result of a 
historically binding trade-limit, a possibility that Chenery and Strout seem to 
have missed by dropping the import-content of investment from equation 13 
-(p. 689) in their paper (in the corresponding equation in the Chenery-MacEwan 
paper --- equation 10, p. 217 --- the marginal import rate on investment is 
estimated to be as high as .35, while it is zero in equation 13 of the Chenery­
Strout paper.) Even for countries where this has not happened, the question 
may be raised whether historically such countries have indeed been saving 
their utmost! On the other hand, a parallel question may be asked for 
' countries where historically the trade-limit has not been binding: have such 
countries been minimizing imports historically? If not, what is the validity 
of including ex-post imports of an arbitrary base year as an argument in the 
minimum import function? 
